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The Plain View Doctrine Strikes Out in Digital
File Searches
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Abstract: On April 8, 2004, federal agents raided two drug
testing laboratories seeking information related to
"anonymous" performance-enhancing drug tests
administered to ten Major League Baseball players. The
search was pursuant to a properly executed search
warrant, which authorized the agents to obtain testing
records and specimens for the ten named players. The lab
also possessed drug-testing information on other players
for whom the agents did not have permission to search, so
the agents relied on the "plain view doctrine," an extension
of the Fourth Amendment that allows investigators to
search and seize items that are in "plain view" during a
legal search. Investigators used information seized under
the plain view doctrine to obtain search warrants for the
records of over loo athletes who had tested positive for
steroids.
The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA),
on the players' behalf, sought return of all records
discovered outside the scope of the warrant. After three
district courts ruled for the MLBPA, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that (1)
the government had demonstrated a need to seize
intermingled evidence for off-site review and its plan for
sorting was approved by a magistrate, and (2) no rule
exists that evidence turned up during a rightful search must
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be excluded because it supports charges for a related crime
not expressly stated in the warrant. An en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the
government had overstepped the warrant and the plain
view doctrine in using the evidence it found to apply for
more warrants.
Many federal and state courts have looked at the
applicability of the plain view doctrine to digital file
searches. This Note will analyze those cases, in addition to
the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision. The Note will argue
that the plain view doctrine should not generally apply to
computer searches, as computers contain vast amounts of
easily accessible information and are ripe for abuse by
government investigators. Courts addressing this issue
should remain true to the Fourth Amendment and the
purposes of the plain view doctrine, and protect people's
Fourth Amendment rights by generally prohibiting
application of the plain view doctrine to electronically
stored data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The plain view doctrine allows a government official, under the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to seize items without a
warrant provided that the officer is lawfully present at the place where
the evidence can be plainly viewed, the officer has a lawful right of
access to the object, and the incriminating character of the object is
immediately apparent.' The plain view doctrine has undergone
significant changes since it was first articulated in the plurality
opinion of Coolidge v. New Hampshire.2 The police originally used
the plain view doctrine to seize things such as stolen stereo equipment
or illegal weapons found during a drug raid.3 Over the last two
decades, the advent and increased presence of new technologies-
most notably personal computers-have brought into question how
the plain view doctrine should apply to searches of digitally stored
data and information.
' Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990).
2 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); see Horton, 496 U.S. at 138-41 (removing the requirement that
evidence must be discovered "inadvertently"); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327-
28 (1987) (holding that a police officer could not turn a stereo in order to check its serial
number to confirm that it was stolen).
3'See generally Hicks, 480 U.S. 321; United States v. Tate, 133 F. App'x 447 (9th Cir. 2005).
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One such attempt to apply the plain view doctrine to government
searches of computer files took the field against the Major League
Baseball Players Association (the "MLBPA").4 In the 2000S,
allegations began to surface that a significant number of the MLB's
players were using performance-enhancing drugs ("PEDs"). Congress
held hearings on the subject of steroids in baseball and eventually
initiated investigations into the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative
("BALCO") and several MLB players.s Jose Canseco, a former MLB
player, wrote a "tell-all" book that detailed, among other things, his
use of steroids while an MLB player as well as that of several other
players whom he "knew" to use steroids.6 The MLB responded by
instituting a "survey" level of drug testing in 2003, which was
administered by Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc. ("CDT") and Quest
Diagnostics Inc. ("Quest").7 The specimens were stored at Quest under
a number coding system, while the names were stored electronically at
CDT. 8
In November of 2003, the government began attempting to obtain
the results of the MLB's drug tests.9 To search CDT and Quest, the
government procured warrants that authorized the seizure of
information relating to ten named players with connections to
BALCO.o Investigators confiscated and searched pieces of computer
equipment, including one computer that contained the "Tracey"
directory." This directory contained information on eight of the ten
players named in the warrant, as well as twenty-six other MLB players
4 Major League Baseball ("The MLB") and the MLBPA are not strangers to the federal
courts. See Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (Finding the MLB
exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Laws); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (Upholding
Federal Baseball Club's judgment, but questioning its rationale); Baltimore Orioles v.
Major League Baseball Player's Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
5 Rebecca Shore, How We Got Here: A Timeline ofPerformance-Enhancing Drugs in
Sports, SI.coM, Mar. 11, 20o8, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/magazine/o3/11/steroid.timeline/index.html.
61d
7See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d 1o85, 1090 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
8 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1093.
9 Id. at logo.
10 Id. These 1o players' names were filed under seal and thus are not available. Id. at n-4.
1 Id. at 1092.
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and many other professional athletes.12 Federal investigators
eventually used this information to apply for warrants covering over
1oo non-BALCO players who had tested positive for PEDs.'3
The MLBPA filed motions in two district courts, seeking the return
of the specimens and drug testing records of those players not
specified in the original warrant.14 The two courts granted the
MLBPA's motions and ordered a return of the property.15 The
Government appealed the decisions of the district courts to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which led to the panel
decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing (referred to
as "CDT').16 The CDT panel reversed the district courts' decisions,
finding that the government's seizure of intermingled evidence for off-
site review through the search warrant was lawful.17 The MLBPA
appealed, and an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reheard the case
and reversed. A majority found the plain view doctrine inapplicable to
computer searches and prescribed an alternate procedure that must
be used by law enforcement when seeking information from a
computer or other digital device.' The government petitioned for a
rehearing of the en banc decision to the entire Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.19 In response, the Ninth Circuit rescinded its original opinion
and issued a new opinion, which reached the same decision in the
case, but moved some of the more controversial language from the
majority opinion to a concurring opinion.20
This Note will explore United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing as it pertains to the plain view doctrine and its application to
government searches of computer files. The Ninth Circuit en banc
decision and its concurring opinion by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski
12 Id. at 1093.
13 Id. at 1094.
14 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d at 1094.
'5 Id at 1094-95.
16Md at 1090.
171d. at 1110-12.
i8 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F-3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en bane).
19 Neither party petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
20 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane).
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properly apply the plain view doctrine to computer searches.2l
Computers contain a lot of information that is easily searched and
viewed. Past court decisions applying the plain view doctrine to
computer file searches fail to recognize law enforcement officers'
ability to abuse the scope of their warrants and unreasonably invade
the privacy of citizens in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Future
decisions by the courts should adhere to the wisdom and logic of the
Ninth Circuit en banc opinion and the concurring opinion of Chief
Judge Kozinski. Its analysis strikes the correct balance between law
enforcement's need to execute searches and the need to protect the
public's right to privacy.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 178922 and incorporated to the
states in its entirety in 1961.23 The amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.24
Thus, the Fourth Amendment has two distinct parts: (1) it protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement, and
(2) it provides that government searches must be accompanied by a
21 Chief Judge Alex Kozinski's concurrence was originally part of the Ninth Circuit's en
banc decision, but was changed to a concurrence when the opinion was reissued. This was
because the language now in Chief Judge Kozinski's concurrence was seen as more
advisory, or forward-looking, and not actually necessary to the Ninth Circuit's decision.
Five of the eleven judges to hear this case en bane joined the Chief Judge's concurrence.
See id. (Kozinski, J., concurring) at 1178.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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warrant, issued upon probable cause, that states the nature of the
search and the items sought during the search.
The plain view doctrine serves as an exception to the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches must be conducted with a
warrant. In order to invoke the plain view doctrine, (i) the officer
must be lawfully present at the place where the evidence can be
plainly viewed, (2) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the
object, and (3) the incriminating character of the object must be
immediately apparent. 2 5 An additional requirement, that plain view
evidence must be discovered inadvertently, was originally a part of
the plain view doctrine but has since been removed.26 A further
restriction on the plain view doctrine is that law enforcement may not
move or alter items in order to bring them into plain view.27 For
instance, a police officer may not turn over a stereo so that he can see
its serial number and confirm that it is stolen.28
Federal courts enforce the Fourth Amendment's protections
through the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule states that
evidence collected or analyzed in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights shall be excluded during a criminal prosecution
in a court of law.29 The exclusionary rule does not apply to searches by
a private person; it applies only to searches by government officials.30
An extension of the exclusionary rule is the "fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine." It states that evidence obtained during an illegal
government search cannot later be used to lead to other admissible
evidence.31 Thus, if the government obtains incriminating information
about the defendant through an illegal search and uses the
information in a second search to find other incriminating
information, the government is presumptively barred from
introducing the information found in the second search. To permit the
admission of evidence obtained through reliance on illegally obtained
evidence would encourage law enforcement to circumvent the Fourth
25 Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 (known as the Horton test).
26d. at 138-41.
27 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327-28.
28d. at 327-29.
29 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1976).
30 See id. at 446-48.
31 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).
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Amendment.32 To avoid the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence,
the government would have to show that the challenged evidence
would inevitably have been discovered in a subsequent lawful
search.33
III. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING
DRUGS
The MLB was officially founded in 1901 and is the professional
baseball league in the United States. The MLB, its owners, and its
players are governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the
"CBA"), which outlines rules and practices governing the MLB owners
and the individual players.34 CBAs have been in effect in the MLB
since 1968.35 The past three CBAs governing the MLB ran from 1997
to 2001 (the "1997 CBA"), 2003 to 2oo6 (the "2003 CBA"), and 2007
to the present36 (the "2007 CBA").
Performance-enhancing drugs ("PEDs") are substances that
athletes use to gain physical or chemical advantages which lead to a
competitive advantage in their sport.37 A common form of PED is
anabolic-androgenic steroids, which are used to increase muscle mass
and strength.38 Other common PEDs are androstenedione,
tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) and creatine.39 While PEDs do enhance
muscle recovery, strength and energy, they pose several health risks,
ranging from dehydration and hair loss to heart attack and even
32 See id.
33 Id.
34 For the 1997 and 2003 CBAs, see Business of Baseball,
http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/data.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2011); for the
2007 CBA, see MLBPA Info, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/cba.jsp.
35 MLBPA Info, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/cba.jsp. The MLB was
the first professional sports league to have a CBA. Id.
36 The 2007 CBA is set to expire in 2011. Id.
37 See Mayo Clinic, Performance-enhancing drugs: Are they a risk to your health?,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/performance-enhancing-drugs/HQono5 (last visited
Aug. 30, 2011).
38Id.
39 Id.
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death.40 The use of PEDs is illegal in the United States and banned in
most professional sports leagues."'
Several events in the MLB led Congress to launch an investigation
into the use of PEDs in the sport in the early 2000S. First, the single-
season homerun record was broken twice in a three-year span: once in
1998 by Mark McGwire (seventy homeruns) and again in 2001 by
Barry Bonds (seventy-three homeruns).42 Prior to 1998, the homerun
record (sixty-one homeruns) had stood since 1961.43 These sudden
challenges to the homerun record were indicative of a "power surge"
that occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000S. Second, in 2005
former MLB player Jose Canseco published a "tell-all" book, Juiced:
Wild Times, Rampant 'Roids, Smash Hits & How Baseball Got Big,44
in which he discussed his use of steroids, as well as other players of
whose steroid use he either knew or suspected.45 Third, Ken Caminiti
admitted to Sports Illustrated in 2002 that he used steroids and that
he believed "at least half' of his fellow players used them too.46 He
died in 2004 from a heart attack at age 41.47
In light of these events, Congress conducted hearings and
investigations, using its subpoena power to elicit the testimony of
several players and prodding the MLB to get tough on steroids.48 In
40 Id.
41d.
42 Baseball-Reference.com, Progressive Leaders & Records for Home Runs,
http://www.baseball-reference.com/leaders/HRprogress.shtml (last visited Aug. 30,
2011).
43 Id.
44 JOSE CANSECO, JUICED: WILD TIMES, RAMPANT 'ROIDS, SMASH HITS, AND How BASEBALL
GOT BIG (William Morrow 2005).
45 See Bill Nowlin, 'Juiced' Slugger Goes to Bat for Steroids, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2005,
available at
http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2005/o3/o2/juiced slugger-goes-to-bat-for
steroids/.
46 Tom Verducci, et al., Totally Juiced, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 34.
47 How We Got Here, supra note 5, at 3.
48 Baseball's Steroid Era: Written Steroid Era Timeline,
http://thesteroidera.blogspot.com/20o6/o8/baseballs-steroid-era-timeline.html (Aug. 14,
2oo6).
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2003, the MLB instituted its first form of drug testing, and the 2003
CBA was the first to include such provisions.49
IV. THE GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING AND
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS
The government, as part of its investigation into BALCO and
BALCO's connection to the MLB, subpoenaed the MLB for drug
testing information relating to eleven MLB players.5o The names of
these players were filed under seal and were not disclosed to the
public.51 The MLB responded that it did not possess the information
requested.52 The government reasoned that the drug testing
information must be at CDT and Quest and issued subpoenas upon
both organizations.53 The original subpoenas requested drug test
results for all MLB players tested during the 2003 season.54 When
CDT and Quest refused this request, the government obtained new
subpoenas for information regarding only the eleven players they
originally identified to the MLB.ss Government investigators
eventually withdrew their subpoena for one of the eleven players, thus
limiting their request to ten BALCO-related targets.56 Two days before
the information requested in the subpoenas was due to federal
investigators, the MLBPA filed a motion on behalf of the ten players to
quash the government's subpoenas.57
In response to this motion, the government filed for warrants that
permitted them to search CDT and Quest for the information
49 See 2003 CBA, supra note 34; see also MLBPA Info, supra note 35, for a copy of the
current MLB drug-testing policy, the Joint Drug Agreement.
5oComprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1090.
51MI.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d at 1090 n.7.
57 Id. at 1091.
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requested in the subpoenas.@ The investigators expected to find
testing evidence at both locations and knew that information from one
location was necessary to identify relevant records from the other
location.59 The warrants specifically authorized investigators to search
for and seize the drug testing records and specimens for ten named
BALCO-connected players, as well as any emails, correspondence,
"manuals, pamphlets, booklets, contracts, agreements [or] other
materials" which explained the administration of the MLB's drug
testing program by CDT or Quest.60 The warrants were issued in the
Central District of California for the search of CDT and in the District
of Nevada for the search of Quest on April 7, 2004.61
On April 8, federal agents executed the warrants on CDT and
Quest.62 Among the twelve investigators were Jeff Novitzky, the case's
lead agent, and Joseph Abboud, a Computer Investigative Specialist. 63
At first, CDT refused to assist the investigators, telling them they
should "do what they needed to do." 64 However, after agents
threatened to seize all of CDT's computers, CDT agreed to help
investigators by identifying "two computers on which agents would
find information relevant to the search warrant."65 CDT was clear that
this assistance did not constitute consent to the government's
search.66 A document that contained drug test results for the ten
named BALCO players was presented to investigators.67 Additionally,
a CDT director identified the "Tracey" directory, which contained all
the files relating to CDT's drug testing program. 68 The directory
58 Id.
59 Id.
6oId.
61Id.
62 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d at 1092-93.
63 Id. at 1092.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66Id.
67 Id.
68Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d at 1092.
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contained many subdirectories and hundreds of files, so agent Abboud
recommended copying the entire directory for off-site review.69 The
warrant contemplated this situation and allowed for copying of the
directory.70
During the CDT search, a separate set of federal agents executed
their search warrant on Quest.71 These agents were unable to locate
the specimen samples contained in the warrant, as the warrant listed
the players by name, but the Quest specimens were stored by
number.72 The documents collected at CDT included a list of names
and identifying numbers for all MLB players, including some of the
ten named in the warrant. 73 The Nevada agents received this
information, obtained a new warrant for the then-known BALCO
players' specimens and executed it on the evening of April 8.74 Other
documents collected at CDT, in addition to the names and identifying
numbers, included a twenty-five page master list of all MLB players
tested during the 2003 season and a thirty-four page list of positive
drug test results.75 Of the names listed in the thirty-four page
document, eight of the ten players listed in the warrant were present;
the names of twenty-six players not named in the warrant were also
listed in this document.76
Agent Novitzky reviewed the contents of the Tracey directory upon
returning to his office after the search of CDT.77 He found five
subdirectories, labeled "MAJOR LEAGUE GROUP," "MLB BILLING,"
"MLB Drug Subcommittee," "MLB Follow Up," and "MLB IOC," which
were related to the MLB.78 Novitzky proceeded to search these
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1092-93.
71 Id. at 1093.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1093.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78d. at 1093-94 n.20.
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directories and identify files that the warrant authorized for seizure.79
One of the files Novitzky found was the master list of all positive drug
test results.so On April 26, the MLBPA filed a motion under FED. R.
CIV. P. 41(g), seeking return of the seized property.8 ' On May 5, the
government applied for new search warrants to seize all specimens
and records relating to more than loo players who had tested positive
for steroids.82 Again, the government applied for warrants in both the
District of Nevada and the Central District of California, since that is
where Quest and CDT were located, respectively.83 The warrants were
supported by information found in the Tracey directory. 84 The courts
issued the warrants, and on May 6, federal agents again raided CDT
and Quest.5 In response, the MLBPA filed more Rule 41(g) motions,
seeking return of the seized specimens and records.86
On August 19, the District of Nevada Court granted the MLBPA's
Rule 41(g) motion and ordered the return of the specimens seized and
the notes compiled by the agents who reviewed the evidence, except
those pertaining to the ten BALCO players named in the warrant.87
The court found that "[t]he government callously disregarded the
affected players' constitutional rights and that the government
unreasonably refused [to follow the procedures set forth in United
States v. Tamura]."88 Approximately six weeks later, the Central
District of California Court followed suit and granted the MLBPA's
79 Id. at 1093.
So Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d at 1093.
81 Id.
82Id at 1094.
83 Id.
84 Id.
55 Id.
86Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1094.
87Id.
881Id. at 1094-95 (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally U.S. v. Tamura, 694
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
670 [Vol. 6:3
DODOVICH
motion.89 That court rejected the government's contention that the
computer files were seizeable under the plain view doctrine.90
The government appealed both of these decisions to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which consolidated the
cases into United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing.91
V. UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING CASE HISTORY
The case history of United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing
is unusual and illustrative of the complexity and importance of the
legal issue presented. The same three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
heard the case twice, which resulted in the original opinion being
rewritten and superseded by the opinion discussed below.92 The
revised opinion was then appealed to an en banc panel of the Ninth
Circuit, which issued its first opinion on August 26, 2oo8.93 Upon a
request for rehearing by the government, the Ninth Circuit en banc
panel rescinded its original opinion and issued a similar, replacement
opinion.94 The government has stated that it will not petition for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in this case. 95
89 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1095.
90 Id.
91 Id. The government also appealed the decision of the District Court for the Northern
District of California to quash a subpoena for the players' records. Id. That issue did not
involve the plain view doctrine.
92 This case was originally decided on December 27, 2oo6 as United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 473 F-3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006). It was rescinded and reissued
as United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d lo85 (9th Cir. 20o8).
93 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F-3d at 989 (en banc). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals is the largest of the 13 circuits-it covers 9 states and has 29 active judgeships.
While in most jurisdictions an en banc hearing is done before all the active circuit judges,
this practice is not feasible in the Ninth Circuit. As such, the Ninth Circuit Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure provide for a "limited en banc" review, in which the Chief Judge and
1o of the other 28 judges are randomly selected to rehear the case. 9TH CIR. APP. R. 35-3.
The rules further allow for an en banc rehearing by the "full court." Id.
94 U.S. v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F-3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). The new opinion
stated that it "shall constitute the final action of the court. No petitions for rehearing will
be considered." Id. at 1165.
95 ESPN.go.com, List of positive tests burred from courts,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id= 5907927 (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
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A. UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING: THE FIRST
APPEAL
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed its
opinion on January 24, 2008. The panel reversed the district courts'
decisions, finding that the government's seizure of "intermingled
evidence" for off-site review pursuant to a warrant was lawful.96 This
opinion was joined by two of the three judges, with the third judge
filing a dissent.97
The MLBPA argued that the seizure of property from Quest was
unreasonable because the search warrant lacked a legally acceptable
foundation.98 The search warrant was not legally acceptable because it
was based on evidence obtained from intermingled files seized at CDT,
which named individuals other than the ten players originally
targeted. Because these names, in the view of the MLBPA, were
illegally seized, evidence discovered on the basis of their unlawful
discovery should be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree."99
The court, however, rejected this argument, relying on Tamura, a
case involving the seizure of a set of hard-copy files including target
data as well as information not specified in the warrant. 00 In Tamura,
the court ruled that the agents' seizure of files outside of the warrant
was impermissible, as it effectively converted the specific warrant into
a general one.'0' This conversion violated the aggrieved party's Fourth
Amendment rights. The Tamura court identified two ways that the
agents could have avoided this constitutional violation.o2 First, if the
government anticipated that on-site segregation of target documents
would not be feasible, it could seek a provision in the warrant to
obtain intermingled documents.03 Second, if the government
96 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d. at 1116.
97 See id.
981d. at 1105.
99 Id.
1oo Id. at 11o6.
1o1 Id.
102 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d. at 11o6.
103 Id.
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obtained a warrant without a protocol for removing intermingled data,
but encountered an unanticipated need to seize units with
intermingled data, the agents could seize these units and seal them
pending post-search review authorized by the "judgment of a neutral,
detached magistrate."104 Tamura has since been applied to uphold the
seizure of intermingled documents in the computer context.105 In
United States v. Adjani, the search warrant contained a detailed
protocol for the seizure of intermingled evidence, thus complying with
Tamura and the Fourth Amendment.106
Applying Tamura, the United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing court found that the government's seizure of the Tracey
directory was within the scope of the warrant. 07 The government
agents had set forth a protocol for collecting evidence in their warrant
and followed the protocol during their raid on CDT and Quest.1oS
Furthermore, the agents had anticipated the necessity of off-site
review and not only created a procedure for collecting the data, but
also brought along a computer technician to assist with the data
collection.1o9 Because the Tracey directory was seized in accordance
with these procedures, it was in compliance with Tamura and the
Fourth Amendment.110
The court next dismissed the MLBPA's contention that the agents
acted unreasonably by copying the entire Tracey directory."' The court
discussed the difficulty in segregating intermingled electronic data, as
well as the necessary balance between the government's right to
investigate and seize data versus CDT's right to continue its business
activities without interruption.112 By copying the Tracey directory, the
government was able to avoid seizing CDT's computers, which would
104 Id. at 1107.
105 See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006).
1o6 Id. at 1148-50.
107 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1110-12.
'o8 Id. at 1110.
109 Id.
110 See id. at 1110-11.
,I Id.
112 Id.
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have greatly hindered CDT's ability to function as a business.113 Thus,
the court found that the government was more than reasonable in
forbearing from a "wholesale seizure."114
The court next dismissed the MLBPA's assertion that Agent
Novitzky's viewing of the data was not within the protocol of the
warrant, as he was not "computer personnel.""s The court noted that
the "plain language of the search warrant did not exclude" Agent
Novitzky from assisting with review of the data; the warrant mandated
only that computer personnel determine whether "on-site segregation
of target data" was feasible."16
Having found that the agents who searched CDT obeyed the
Fourth Amendment, the court, based on the information from the
search, found no grounds on which to invalidate the subsequent
subpoenas and warrants.117 Because the items in the Tracey directory
were within the scope of the warrant, the court did not reach the
government's plain view argument." 8
B. UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING: THE ENBANc
DECISION
On September 30, 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
an order to rehear United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing en
banc"l9 and ultimately reversed the panel's decision.120 The limited en
banc panel of eleven judges held that the plain view doctrine should
"3 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1111.
114 Id.
11sId.
u16 Id. (emphasis in original).
117 Id. at 1112.
118 Id. at 1112 n.48. The court did not consider the government's plain view argument,
despite the fact that it was the government's sole proffered defense to its warrantless
seizure of the data pertaining to the unlisted players. See id. at 1144 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
119 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d 989 (en banc).
120 Id.
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not be applicable to computer searches and outlined a set of
guidelines that judges should follow in applying this new standard.121
The en banc panel evaluated the government's compliance with
Tamura in its execution of warrants on CDT and Quest.122 The
government contended that it did comply with Tamura and that it
was not required to return any data pertaining to players not listed in
the original warrant because that evidence was in plain view upon the
agent's examination of the Tracey directory.123 The court rejected this
argument, emphasizing that the point of the Tamura procedures is to
"maintain the privacy of materials that are intermingled with seizable
materials and to avoid turning a limited search for particular
information into a general search of office file systems and computer
databases."24 The majority noted that, under the government's
proposed ruling, everything the government chose to seize would
automatically come into plain view, creating a "powerful incentive to
seize more rather than less."125 The court further stated that such a
ruling would "make a mockery of Tamura" and render its safeguards a
"nullity. "126
To avoid this "illogical result," the court suggested that the
government must renounce its reliance on the plain view doctrine in
digital file searches.127 The court then laid out a set of guidelines that
must be followed if the government continues to rely on the plain view
doctrine, including inspection of all collected digital files by a third-
party to separate seizable from non-seizable data.128 The court advised
that the process of sorting and separating seizable and non-seizable
data must be designed to gather seizable data only.129 Thus, in this
case, the government would have needed to design a search protocol
121 Id. at loo6-07.
122 See id. at 997.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
125 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 998 (en bane).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. Either that, or simply refuse to issue the warrant. Id.
129 Id. at 999.
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to discover data pertaining to only the ten players named in the
warrants, and only their drug test results.13o
The court also found that the agents acted in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by allowing Agent Novitzky to conduct the initial
review of the Tracey directory.131 Pursuant to the procedures in the
warrant, computer personnel were to conduct the initial review of the
seized data and segregate material not subject to warrant for return to
the owner.132 The government did not follow this procedure, but
rather immediately sought out information on all professional
baseball players in order to obtain warrants and subpoenas to further
the investigation.13 The computer analysts copied the directory, but
did nothing to segregate the target data from the comingled data.134
The government argued that it did not violate the text or the spirit
of the warrant because the warrant did not specify that only computer
personnel could review the seized files.s35 The court rejected this
argument, finding that it would make no sense to have computer
personnel segregate the data if all investigatory personnel were able to
review all of it in any event.136 The court found that the government's
position lacked "common sense" and that its actions constituted
"deliberate overreaching... in an effort to seize data as to which [the
government] lacked probable cause."137
The court proposed that, in future cases, the government include a
provision in its warrants to prevent investigating agents from
examining or retaining any data for which probable cause had not
been shown.138 This might require segregation to be done by an
130 Id.
131 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 999 (en banc).
132 Id.
133 Id. The government admitted that the idea behind taking the entire Tracey Directory
was to see "if there was anything above and beyond that which was authorized for seizure
in the initial warrant." Id.
34 Id.
135 Id. at looo.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138Id.
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independent third party. 39 Once the data have been segregated, the
government agents may examine only the data within the scope of
their warrant; all other data would have to be destroyed or returned to
its owner.140 The government must then provide a return disclosing
exactly which data had been retained and which data had been
returned.'4'
Based on its blanket denial of the plain view doctrine's
applicability to computer searches, the en banc panel affirmed the
district court orders, which granted CDT and the MLBPA return of the
data not expressly targeted by the initial warrants.142
C. UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING: THE EN BANC
DECISION, TAKE Two
On November 4, 2009, the Ninth Circuit issued an order
requesting both parties to the case to submit briefs arguing whether
the case should be reheard in front of the entire Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.143 After briefing on the issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals en banc panel that originally decided the case rescinded its
original opinion and issued a replacement opinion, in lieu of a
rehearing, on September 13, 201O.144
Although most of the new per curium opinion is taken verbatim
from the original opinion, the court did back away from its
denouncement of the plain view doctrine in electronic searches and
removed its advisory language on how such searches should be
handled by the government.145 The court reached the same conclusion
as it did in its original opinion: it expanded the applicability of
Tamura to digital file searches and ruled that the government had
139 Id.
40 Id.
141Id. at 1oo1.
142 Id. at 1007.
143 Order at 2, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, No. 05-loo67 (9th Cir. Nov.
4, 2009).
'4 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
45 See generally id.
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violated the protections of Tamura.146 The court did note the
complexity and importance of the issue and stated that the courts and
judges must guard against over-reaching and abuse of the plain view
doctrine in digital file searches by the government.147 The advisory
language on the administration of digital file searches and the
denouncement of the plain view doctrine in digital file searches were
moved into a concurring opinion by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, which
was joined by five of the eleven judges on the en banc panel.148
VI. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPLICATION OF THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL FILE SEARCHES
Application of the plain view doctrine to government searches of
computer files is a relatively new endeavor. While no court has
adopted the Ninth Circuit's test or the test in Chief Judge Kozinski's
concurrence, the other jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue
have not reached a consensus rule either. This Part will address the
other, less prominent cases where the plain view doctrine was applied
to a search of digitally stored data. These decisions, while helpful in
resolving this issue, provide far less analysis than United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing.
A. FEDERAL CASES ADDRESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL SEARCHES
Besides the Ninth Circuit, courts in seven other circuits have heard
at least one case relating to the plain view doctrine and electronically
stored information. Four of these seven circuits-the Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits-have dealt with this issue at the
appellate level.149 The remaining three circuits-the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits-have each seen a case at the district court level
146 Id. at 1170-73.
47 Id. at 1175-78.
148 Id. at 1178-80. (Kozinski, C.J. concurring).
49 See United States v. Mann, 592 F-3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Carey, 172
F.3d ia68 (1oth Cir. 1999); United States v. Alexander, 574 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Miranda, 325 F. App'x 858 (iith Cir. 2009).
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relating to the plain view doctrine and electronically stored data.1so Of
these seven federal decisions, two hold that the plain view doctrine is
not allowed or is severely limited in a search of electronically stored
information; the remaining five decisions allow use of the plain view
doctrine to admit into evidence electronically stored information
obtained without a warrant.
1. FEDERAL CASES WHERE THE COURT PERMITTED THE USE OF THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE TO OBTAIN ELECTRONIC DATA
In the Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Mann, Mann, a life
guard instructor, covertly installed a video camera in a women's locker
room to record footage of the women changing their clothes.1s1 Two
women discovered the camera and turned it over to the police. The
police then executed a warrant at Mann's home and seized two
desktop computers, a laptop, and an external hard drive.152 On the
seized equipment, police discovered (1) evidence that Mann had
visited a website called "Perverts Are Us," where he read and possibly
downloaded stories about child molestation, (2) pictures from a high
school girls' locker room, (3) other child pornography, and (4) a story
about a swim coach masturbating while watching young girls swim.153
Mann argued that the court should adopt the en banc panel's
approach in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing when
dealing with a computer search and seizure of evidence not directly
contemplated in the warrant. 154 While the court conceded that the
Ninth Circuit's approach "provide[s] some guidance," it agreed with
the dissent's position that "jettisoning the plain view doctrine entirely
in digital evidence cases is an efficient but overbroad approach."1s
The court did, however, state that those involved in searches of digital
15o See United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp.2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 20o8); United States v.
O'Brien, 498 F.Supp.2d 520 (N.D. N.Y. 2007); United States v. Gray, 78 F.Supp.2d 524
(E.D. Va. 1999).
15I Mann, 592 F.3d at 780
152 Id. at 780-81.
153 Id. at 781.
154 Id. at 785.
155 Id. (original quotations marks omitted; citing Comprehensive Drug Testing, 57 F.3d at
1013 (Callahan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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media should "exercise caution to ensure that warrants describe with
particularity the things to be seized and that searches are narrowly
tailored to uncover only those things described."156
In the Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Alexander, Alexander
had secretly videotaped women engaging in consensual sexual activity
with him.57 During a search of Alexander's residence, pursuant to a
valid warrant, police found an email printout confirming subscription
to a child pornography website and actual printouts of child
pornography.5 8 Police subsequently seized Alexander's computer and
digital camera and gave them to a computer forensic analyst.159 A
search of Alexander's computer revealed child pornography.16o
Alexander challenged the admission of the child pornography,
arguing that the police exceeded the scope of their warranted
search.' 6' The court, using the plain view doctrine, found Alexander's
claim was "without merit."16 2 Because there were photographs of
underage children and an email printout confirming subscription to a
child pornography website in plain view, the criminal character of the
computer and those items was immediately apparent. 63
In United States v. Miranda, an Eleventh Circuit case, Miranda
argued that police exceeded the scope of their warrant when they were
looking for counterfeit software and instead found pornographic
images involving minors.164 He further argued that the image files
were closed and thus were not in plain view.16s The court noted that a
search warrant must "particularly describe the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." 66 The court determined,
1s6 Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
'57 Alexander, 574 F.3d at 486.
158 Id. at 487.
159 Id.
16o Id.
161 Id. at 490.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 490-91.
164 Miranda, 325 F. App'x at 859-60.
16.5 Id.
166 Id. at 86o (citing United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1289 (iith Cir. 2007)).
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however, that the particularity requirement must be "applied with a
practical margin of flexibility." 67 The court found that the officers in
this case were acting pursuant to a valid warrant and thus had a
"lawful right to view each file to determine whether or not it was
evidence of counterfeiting crimes." 68 Because the child pornography
was intermingled with the counterfeiting files, they were in plain
view.' 69
In United States v. O'Brien, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York allowed the government to use the
plain view doctrine to admit evidence obtained without a warrant. 70
O'Brien was a teacher who was accused of having inappropriate sexual
relationships with some of his minor students.171 While being
interviewed by police, O'Brien admitted to having one photograph of a
nude minor child on his Compaq computer.172 When police arrived to
search O'Brien's house, they noticed a Gateway computer in addition
to the Compaq.173 The police asked O'Brien if they could search the
Gateway computer and O'Brien consented; the Gateway contained
evidence of criminal behavior.174
O'Brien moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that his consent
was tainted by unconstitutional police tactics.175 The court ruled that
the consent was not tainted, and in the alternative, even if it was
tainted, the police could have searched the computer under the plain
view doctrine.176 The court began by noting that the officers were
lawfully in a place where they could see the Gateway:177 "The only
167 Id. at 86o.
16 Id. (emphasis added).
169 Id.
170 O'Brien, 498 F.Supp.2d at 545.
171 Id. at 526.
172 Id. at 528. O'Brien later admitted to having a "few' photographs of this nature on his
computer. Id. at 529.
'73 Id. at 529.
174 Id. at 530, 543-45.
'75 Id. at 543.
176 Id. at 544-45
'77 Id. at 545.
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issue [was] whether [the Gateway's] incriminating nature was readily
apparent."178 Based on O'Brien's past admission to the police and the
Gateway's proximity to the other computer equipment, the court
found that police had probable cause (a standard synonymous with
"readily apparent") to search the Gateway.179
In United States v. Gray, FBI agents executed a search warrant
looking for evidence of unauthorized computer intrusions
("hacking").1so An FBI computer specialist proceeded to copy an entire
hard drive onto CD-ROMs.'81 During the copying process, the
computer specialist followed standard operating procedure and
proceeded to open and briefly look at the files being copied, in hopes
of expediting the search.182 The computer specialist eventually
stumbled upon two directories containing ".jpg" (or JPEG) files;183 the
directories were entitled "Teen" and "Tiny Teen." 84 The computer
specialist viewed the files in these directories while looking for
evidence of computer hacking, only to find pornographic images
involving minors. 8 s
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted that
searches of computer files "present the same problem as document
searches-the intermingling of relevant and irrelevant materials-but
to a heightened degree."8 6 The court found that searches done within
the "Teen" and "Tiny Teen" directories were within the scope of the
warrant, which allowed agents to search the "computer files" for
evidence of computer hacking.187 The court ruled that anything found
178 Id.
179 Id.
iso Gray, 78 F.Supp.2d at 526.
si Id.
182 Id.
183 jpg (or JPEG) are common file extensions of digitally stored photographs or picture
files.
184 Gray, 78 F.Supp.2d at 527.
s85I.
186 Id. at 529 (citing United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 583 (D.Vt. 1998),
(emphasis added)).
187 Id.
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while reviewing the documents for evidence of computer hacking was
within "plain view" and thus admissible against Gray.
2. FEDERAL CASES WHERE THE COURT DID NOT PERMIT THE USE OF
THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE TO OBTAIN ELECTRONIC DATA
In United States v. Carey, a Tenth Circuit case, police searched
Carey's home for drugs and drug paraphernalia, taking two computers
in the process.189 The warrant authorized police to search the
computers for names, phone numbers, and other documentary
evidence pertaining to the sale or distribution of drugs.190 Upon
searching the computers, police found several JPEGs with sexually
suggestive file names.191 The detective downloaded approximately 244
image files and opened some of them. Some of the opened files
contained child pornography.192
Carey moved to suppress the evidence, and the government
defended its acquisition of the child pornography under the plain view
doctrine.193 The court noted that "the plain view doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges."194 Here, the warrant
was limited in scope to evidence of drug trafficking.195 The court found
the plain view argument "unavailing" because the contents of the files
and not the files themselves were seized; the files were closed on the
computer and thus not in plain view.'96 The court did narrow its
'88Id. at 530.
189 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1271. It was necessary for the detective to use a different computer to view the
JPEG files. Id.
193 Id. at 1272-73.
194 Id. at 1272 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466).
195 Id. at 1273.
196 Id. See also United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 88 1999 WL 90209 (1st Cir.) (Sexually
suggestive image suddenly coming into "plain view" does not make defendant's computer
files "fair game"); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422 (U.S. Armed Forces 1996)
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ruling, stating that because the officer discovered the first
pornographic image inadvertently, that one image was admissible
under the plain view doctrine. The subsequent pornographic images
were not admissible because he then "knew or at least expected" they
would contain child pornography."97
In United States v. Richardson, a case from the Western District
of Pennsylvania, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
agent searched Richardson's computer because his credit card and
email address had been used in an attempt to access an illegal child
pornography website.198 Richardson recounted past occurrences of
identity theft regarding his credit card, but noted that he had some
past problems with child pornography.199 The agent obtained consent
to search Richardson's two computers for information about "how
these [credit card] charges and allegations occurred."200 While
investigating the possibility of identity theft, the agent found child
pornography on Richardson's computer. 2 0 '
Richardson moved to suppress the evidence as a warrantless
search outside the scope of his consent.20 2 The government attempted
to use the plain view doctrine to justify its discovery of child
pornography.203 The court found the plain view doctrine inapplicable
in this case. 204 The court first noted that "government agents may not
obtain consent to search on the representation that they intend to look
only for certain specified items and subsequently use that consent as a
license to conduct a general exploratory search."205 Because
Richardson's consent was limited to a concern for illegal credit card
(Child pornography found while searching a screen name not in the warrant not in "plain
view").
197Carey, 172 F-3d at 1273, n.4-
198 Richardson, 583 F.Supp.2d at 696-97.
199 Id. at 699.
200 Id. at 701.
201 Id. at 704.
202 Id. at 696.
203 Id. at 716.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 715 (citing United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.ad 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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activity and not images, the federal agents could not rely on the plain
view doctrine to admit the pornographic images; the agent was
"within computer files he was not permitted" to view.2o6
B. STATE CASES ADDRESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL SEARCHES
Three state courts have decided cases relating to the plain view
doctrine and its applicability to electronically stored information. Two
courts have allowed the use of the plain view doctrine to admit
electronic information seized by law enforcement without a
warrant. 2 0 7 One state, Indiana, has ruled against the plain view
doctrine as a basis for admitting into evidence electronically stored
data seized without a warrant.2o8
1. STATE CASES WHERE THE COURT PERMITTED THE USE OF THE PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE TO OBTAIN ELECTRONIC DATA
Massachusetts dealt with the plain view doctrine and its relation to
electronically stored information in Massachusetts v. Hinds, where
police were searching the defendant's computer for emails related to a
shooting over a property dispute.209 The officer received Hinds'
consent to search his computer for "electronic mail" only.210 While
searching Hinds' computer, the officer found JPEG files entitled
"ioYRSLUT," "YNGSX15," "KIDSEX1," and "2BOYS.JPG."211 The
officer searching Hinds' computer had seen the "2BOYS.JPG" file in
another case, and knew it to be child pornography.22 Police seized the
computer and arrested Hinds.213
206 Id. at 716.
207 Massachusetts v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 2002); Missouri v. Franklin, 144
S.W.3d 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
208 Smith v. Indiana, 713 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
209 Hinds, 768 N.E.2d at 1o69.
210 Id. at 1070.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1070.
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Hinds moved to suppress the files obtained during the search of
his computer.214 The government sought to justify the seizure under
the plain view doctrine.215 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
agreed with the government.216 It found that the titles of the files,
which were in plain view in Hinds' computer directory, made the
"incriminating character" of the object apparent'.27 Thus, the officer
was justified in conducting further investigation and seizing the
computer.218
In Missouri v. Franklin, sheriffs' deputies executed a search
warrant on Franklin's home under suspicion that he was making and
selling methamphetamines.219 While searching Franklin's television
room, deputies found twenty-five to thirty unmarked videotapes.220
Deputies were aware that it was common practice for manufacturers
of methamphetamines to create "instructional cooking" videos, so
they proceeded to view the tapes.2 2 ' During the process, deputies
found a tape that contained images of an adult having oral and anal
intercourse with a small child.222
Franklin contested the admission of the videotape containing child
pornography into evidence, arguing that it was neither in the warrant
nor in plain view.223 The court disagreed about the evidence not being
in plain view. 2 2 4 It found that because the tapes were in plain view, the
deputies could inspect them.225 The warrant provided for seizure of
214 Id.
215 See id. at 1072-73.
216 See id.
217Id. at 1073.
218 Id.
219 Franklin, 144 S.W.3d at 357.
220 Id
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See id. at 359-60.
225 Id. at 359.
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drug "paraphernalia," and officers frequently found tapes containing
methamphetamine cooking instructions.22 6  Furthermore, its
incriminating character was immediately apparent, as it depicted a
small child having oral and anal intercourse with an adult.227 Thus, the
tape was properly seized under the plain view doctrine.228
2. A STATE CASE REJECTING THE USE OF THE PLAIN VEw DOCTRINE
TO OBTAIN ELECTRONIC DATA
Indiana is the lone state that has rejected the argument that the
plain view doctrine applies to searches for electronically stored
information. The relevant case involves the search of a cellular
telephone and not a computer, but still encompasses the plain view
issue. In Smith v. Indiana, Smith was a passenger in a car that was
detained during a traffic stop.229 During the stop, Smith consented to
allow the police officer to search the vehicle.23o The police officer
seized both individuals' cellular telephones and took them back to his
car.231 By searching through the phones' internal programming and
contacting the service provider, the officer discerned that the phones
had illegally cloned other phones' identifying numbers.232
The State relied on the plain view doctrine to validate its
warrantless search of the electronic contents of the cellular phones.233
The court found, however, that merely possessing a cellular phone did
not satisfy the plain view doctrine's "immediately apparent" criminal
nature test.234 The court also cited Stanley v. Georgia,235 in which the
226 Id. at 359-60.
227 Id. at 360.
228 Id.
229 Smith, 713 N.E.2d at 345.
230 Id.at 341.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 345.
234 Id.
235 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6872011]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
United States Supreme Court found that the mere possession of a
movie film was not "criminal activity," and officers could thus not use
a projector to inspect the contents of the defendant's film to discover
"previously unsuspected criminal behavior."236 Analogizing to Stanley,
the court suppressed the electronic cellular phone data as evidence.237
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE PLAIN VIEw DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
DIGITAL FILE SEARCHES
Various federal and state courts that have reached the issue differ
about exactly how to apply the plain view doctrine to searches and
seizures of electronic data. Among all the approaches offered,
however, the Ninth Circuit has offered the most compelling analysis.
The en banc opinion in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing
provides the necessary caution over using the plain view doctrine in
digital file searches. Chief Judge Kozinski's concurrence goes a step
further: it provides a clear, well-reasoned rule of law barring police
reliance on the plain view doctrine in electronic data searches. The
court's conclusion, and more so the conclusion of Chief Judge
Kozinski's concurrence, is sound for three reasons: (1) it respects the
importance of protecting an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy; (2) it will induce government agents to seek warrants with
greater specificity; and (3) it acknowledges the simple reality that
digitally stored data are not in plain view.
I would like to make an important note at the outset of the
analysis. It is no coincidence that most of the cases that uphold the
plain view doctrine's applicability to digital file searches involve child
pornography. In the eleven case reviews above, all except
Comprehensive Drug Testing and Smith involved the use of the plain
view doctrine in the discovery of child pornography. An old adage in
the legal community is that "bad facts make bad law." Child
pornography is seen by society and the courts as a particularly
reprehensible crime.238 The justice system must find any reason it can
236 Smith, 713 N.E.2d. at 345
237 Id. at 345-46.
238 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (Child pornography is not susceptible
to the "obscenity" standard that other materials are because child pornography is per se
obscene.). See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding a statute which makes
it illegal to possess child pornography). The author of this piece also believes that
possessing child pornography is opprobrious conduct, but not so opprobrious that one
should lose their Fourth Amendment protections.
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to admit evidence of this type of crime. Thus, a judge, faced with
either excluding the evidence or admitting it using the plain view
doctrine, may generally admit the evidence, even though doing so is
contrary to the Fourth Amendment's express language.
Of the cases that do not allow the plain view doctrine to admit
digital files, one involved professional athletes' drug test records
(United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing), one involved
counterfeit cellular telephones (Smith v. Indiana), and two involved
child pornography (United States v. Carey and United States v.
Richardson). However, in one of the two child pornography cases that
denounce the plain view doctrine in digital file searches, United States
v. Carey, the ruling was narrow enough to admit one child
pornography file into evidence because the police officer inadvertently
found the file. Of the eleven cases involving the applicability of the
plain view doctrine to digital file searches, nine of them involved child
pornography. And of those nine, eight used the plain view doctrine to
admit at least some evidence of possession of child pornography. It is
hard to ignore this correlation and its affirmation that "bad facts make
bad law."
A. THE PEOPLE'S EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY MUST BE PROTECTED
The Fourth Amendment guarantees to all Americans a
fundamental right of privacy,239 so long as the person seeking to
invoke its protection can claim a "legitimate expectation of privacy" to
be protected.240 A legitimate expectation of privacy must be more than
an idiosyncratic subjective expectation; it must be a reliance interest
that society recognizes as objectively reasonable.241 The rights created
by the Fourth Amendment are so fundamental that the Court has
deemed it fully incorporated as against the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.242
The dissent in the United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing
panel opinion begins by quoting rhetorical questions posed by one of
the district court judges who rejected the government's arguments:
239 Mapp, 376, U.S. at 655.
240 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
241 Id. at 143 n. 12.
242 See Mcapp, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 1o8 (1964); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
DODOVICH 6892011]1
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
"What happened to the Fourth Amendment? Was it repealed
somehow?"243 If the plain view doctrine is applicable to electronic data
searches, the government basically has the right to seize and retain
anything stored in an electronic device as long as police have a
warrant to look in that electronic device for any reason. 2 44 Such an
approach would render the Fourth Amendment essentially irrelevant
to electronic data searches.
The en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit that decided United States
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing agreed that this outcome could not be
in line with the Fourth Amendment.245 They noted that if the plain
view doctrine applies to electronic data, "then everything the
government chooses to seize will ... automatically" be in plain view,
and thus be admissible as evidence.246 A ruling that the plain view
doctrine applies to electronic data would all but destroy a person's
expectation of privacy in a computer, thus significantly endangering
personal liberty. It would unnecessarily infringe on people's privacy247
without serving the purpose of the plain view doctrine.248 The en banc
decision of the Ninth Circuit recognized these concerns and crafted its
holding to ensure that individual liberty and expectations of privacy
are protected.
B. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE WILL
ENCOURAGE GREATER SPECIFICITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WARRANTS,
IN ADHERENCE WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment states that warrants must "particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."249 The Supreme Court has instructed that "the plain view
243 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1116 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Gray, 78 F. Supp.2d 524; Miranda, 325
Fed. Appx. 859.
245 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 2010 WL 3529247 at 6.
246 Id.
247 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275 (noting a greater risk of overuse of the plain view doctrine with
regard to computer files than paper files because computers can inherently hold more
information that is more easily accessible than a filing cabinet can).
248 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (outlining the purpose of the plain view doctrine).
249 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
690o [Vol. 6:3
DODOVICH
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating emerges."25o
Thus, it seems contrary to the Fourth Amendment's text and the
Supreme Court's instruction on the plain view doctrine to allow it to
expand a search to areas that are not contemplated by a warrant.
However, this is exactly what the majority of jurisdictions are
allowing.25 United States v. Mann, a case that upheld the plain view
doctrine and directly rejected the first en banc opinion in
Comprehensive Drug Testing, even acknowledged that those involved
in searches of digital media should exercise caution to "ensure that
warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized" and that
"searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things
described."252 This guidance, while pertinent, is in obvious tension
with the court's holding, which allows the plain view doctrine to
extend to computer searches. The court's prose simultaneously
suggests sympathy with the Ninth Circuit's concerns and uncertainty
about embodying those concerns in a bold new doctrine.253
The Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion and Chief Judge Kozinski's
concurrence are faithful to the Fourth Amendment. They require the
government, if it wants to obtain something in a search, to ask for it
during the warrant application process and show probable cause
beforehand that it will be found. This is exactly what the Fourth
Amendment requires.254 The Ninth Circuit and Chief Judge Kozinski's
concurrence are not writing new search and seizure law; barring law
enforcement from seizing evidence without probable cause is not a
new concept. Instead, the Ninth Circuit and Chief Judge Kozinski are
adhering carefully to the Fourth Amendment and to Supreme Court
precedent by not allowing the plain view doctrine to turn limited
searches into fishing expeditions. Law enforcement officers may still
search computers, but only for evidence for which they have probable
cause to search.
250 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
251 See O'Brien, 498 F.Supp.2d 520.
252 Mann, 592 F.3d at 786.
253 See id. at 785.
254 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F-3d 1162, at 1168-71.
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C. ITEMS DIGITALLY STORED ARE NOT IN "PLAIN VEW" AS DEFINED
BY CASE LAW
Although the plain view doctrine permits certain warrantless
seizures of evidence, (1) law enforcement personnel must be lawfully
present at the place where the evidence can be plainly viewed, (2) law
enforcement personnel must have a lawful right of access to the
object, and (3) the incriminating character of the object must be
immediately apparent. The first and third parts of the Horton test are
particularly important in addressing the plain view doctrine's use in
digital file searches. In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing,
the agents found the "Tracey" directory, copied it, searched it, and
found the names and test results for several individuals, some of
whom were named in the warrant 5.25 When looking at the Tracey
directory before searching it, however, no "incriminating character"
could have been "immediately apparent." An unopened directory is
just like a manila file folder that is full of documents. The documents
inside the folder may be of interest, but they are not in plain view.
Only the folder is, and it provides nothing of interest by itself. After
all, it is the contents of the directory and not the directory itself that is
seized and offered in issuance of subsequent warrants.256
An unopened file, unless labeled in a way that unambiguously
indicates its criminal character, cannot meet the requirements of the
plain view doctrine. The O'Brien and Franklin cases are thus prime
examples of the plain view doctrine run amok. Courts in both cases
reasoned that because the storage mechanism for the data was in plain
view, the officers were justified in searching it.257 By this logic, if the
police can see a locked car, they can search it because the car itself is
in "plain view." If they can see a house, they can search it because it is
"plain view." All the police would need is some reasonable suspicion to
get their collective foot in the door, and then it would be open
season.258 Although such a conclusion is obviously unsustainable, the
255 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F-3d at 1094.
256 See Carey, 172 F-3d at 1273 ("The government's argument that the files were in plain
view is unavailing because it is the contents of the files and not the files themselves which
were seized.").
257 O'Brien, 498 F.Supp.2d at 545; Franklin, 144 S.W-3d at 359-60.
258 See O'Brien, 498 F.Supp.2d at 545; Franklin, 144 S.W.3d at 359-60. (Where in both
cases, the courts found that since the officers had a lawful right to be in plain view of the
item in which the digital information was stored, they were justified in using the plain view
doctrine.).
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majority of rulings with regard to the plain view doctrine and
electronic searches have so far deployed similar logic.
The Ninth Circuit's en banc decision and the guidelines in Chief
Judge Kozinski's concurrence provide a counterbalance to these
overly-broad exercises of the plain view doctrine. Most of these
computer searches deal with the distribution or possession of child
pornography, which are heinous crimes. It is tempting to use the plain
view doctrine to keep evidence of such a crime in the courts and to
convict the culpable individuals. However, "[n]othing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,"259
and American law says that when the state fails to obtain a warrant or
lacks probable cause and incriminating items are not in plain view, the
items may not be seized and used as evidence against their owner in a
court of law.26o
VII. CONCLUSION
The electronic storage of digital information poses challenges in
the application of legal doctrines formulated in the pre-digital age.
The applicability of the plain view doctrine to searches and seizures of
electronically stored data is a clear case-in-point. The circuits are split
on this issue, and the split is not merely two-sided. Besides the
fundamental disagreement on whether the plain view doctrine has any
role at all to play in electronic searches, even the courts holding the
plain view doctrine permissible seem to differ as to the precise
circumstances that make its use legitimate.
The en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit urged caution in applying
the plain view doctrine in electronic search cases,261 With the
concurrence in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing
denouncing the plain view doctrine in electronic searches and
articulating guidelines that law enforcement should follow to avoid
having searches ruled invalid and evidence suppressed under the
exclusionary rule.262 These guidelines included the segregation and
redaction of files by a third-party computer technician not
contemplated in the warrant, the use of carefully tailored search
protocols designed to uncover only the information targeted by the
259Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
260 See generally Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (explaining the exclusionary rule).
261 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 21 WL 3529247 at 1176-77.
262 Id. at 1178-80. (Kozinski, C.J. concurring).
2011]1 693
I/S: A JOURNAL OF IAW AND POLICY
warrant, and the destruction or return of items not within the scope of
the warrant.263
A significant split among the circuits and the growing importance
of this issue strongly suggest that the Supreme Court should
ultimately determine the applicability of the plain view doctrine to
computer searches. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari on this
issue, the Court should adopt the test as originally articulated by the
Ninth Circuit en banc panel and later issued in Chief Judge Kozinski's
concurring opinion. The court's holding and the concurrence's
guidelines adhere to the text and spirit of the Fourth Amendment,
respect citizens' rights and reasonable expectations of privacy, and
limit the plain view doctrine to its logical scope.
263 Id. at 118o (Kozinski, C.J. concurring).
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